This paper presents a study of mergers in a consumer search market where firms sell homogeneous products. Our first result is that mergers have redistributive effects with consumers searching little getting better off at the expense of consumers who search a lot. Our second result is that the magnitude of search costs is crucial in determining the incentives of firms to merge and the welfare implications of mergers. When search costs are relatively small, mergers turn out not to be profitable for the merging firms, which shows that a "merger paradox" can also arise under price competition. If search costs are relatively high instead, a merger causes a fall in average price and this triggers search. As a result, non-shoppers who didn't find it worthwhile to search in the premerger situation, start searching post-merger. We show that this change in the search composition of demand may make mergers incentive-compatible for the firms and, in some cases, socially desirable.
Introduction
There is an extensive economics literature on mergers. One basic insight is that mergers strengthen firms' market power so that, in the absence of any offsetting effect, mergers are undesirable from a welfare point of view.
1 Perry and Porter (1985) , building on Williamson (1968) , explicitly modelled the cost efficiencies that arise from economies of sharing assets in a setting with homogeneous product markets. They found conditions under which mergers are socially desirable. In antitrust economics, this reduction-in-costs argument in favor of mergers has been called the efficiency defense.
2 Another basic point in the merger literature relates to the incentives of firms to merge. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) derived the paradoxical result that quantity-setting firms selling homogeneous goods do not have an incentive to merge, except in the case where the merger leads to a monopoly. The paradox arises because in the post-merger equilibrium the non-merging firms increase their output relative to the pre-merger situation, which tends to put sufficient pressure on prices so as to make merging unprofitable. This result is known as the merger paradox. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) argued that the strategic nature of the decision variables has an important bearing on firms incentives to merge. Indeed, price-setting firms selling horizontally differentiated products may have an incentive to merge because price increases of the merging firms are accompanied by price increases of the non-merging firms. The price increases, of course, also imply that total welfare is always lower in the post-merger market.
The typical study of mergers has so far ignored that consumers have to incur significant search costs to get informed about prices in real-world markets. An important reason behind this omission is that the search and the industrial organization literatures have followed different paths, specially because most of the search work has studied models with an infinite number of firms (see e.g. Bénabou, 1993; Burdett and Judd, 1983; Reinganum, 1979; Rob, 1985 ; and more recently Rauh, 2007 Rauh, , 2008 . 3 The purpose of this paper is to argue that consumer search provides at least three new and interesting perspectives on the study of mergers. First, as price setting and search intensity are endogenously determined in consumer search models, changes in search behavior bring in additional effects on prices that can either reinforce or weaken the direct effects of a merger on prices. Second, in consumer search models the market equilibrium is often characterized by a distribution of prices rather than by a single price (see e.g. Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989; Reinganum, 1979) . 4 This implies that consumers with different search costs buy from distinct parts of the price distribution. In particular, consumers who search a lot because they have low search costs tend to buy at prices from the lower quantiles of the price distribution; by contrast consumers who have high search costs search little and end up paying relatively high prices. If mergers do not have similar effects on all the quantiles of the price distribution, it is clear that mergers may influence the welfare of different consumers non-uniformly, even opening up the possibility that mergers benefit some consumers at the detriment of others. 5 Finally, an interesting issue is whether search models can say something about the incentives of firms to reduce the number of retail outlets of the new, merged entity. As the prices firms charge are not observable before the search activity takes place and the search cost is sunk at the moment the price is known, merging stores have a stronger temptation to raise their prices after a merger than in standard models. However, if consumers conclude that prices at the stores of the merged firms will be higher than the prices at non-merging stores they would never visit the merging firms. This may give firms an incentive to close down some stores as a way to commit not to raise prices too much.
We study mergers in the classical sequential consumer search model of Stahl (1989) . In this model N retailers sell homogeneous products to two types of consumers, namely, consumers who search at no cost and thus are fully informed at all times -referred to as 'shoppers'-, and consumers who must pay a positive search cost each time they searchreferred to as 'non-shoppers'-. The first price quotation is assumed to be costly (as in Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004 and Janssen et al., 2005) so the market is not fully covered at all times. To contrast our context with the two reactions to the merger paradox outlined above, we assume that mergers do not yield any cost efficiencies and that firms produce homogeneous products. In this model, there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium but, in contrast to the original paper by Stahl (1989) , this equilibrium may come in three types. The distinct types of equilibrium differ in the level of prices that can be sustained in the market and in the search composition of demand.
Our main results about mergers are as follows. We first show that the merging firms have an incentive to shut down one of their retail stores for otherwise rational consumers would first visit the stores of the non-merging firms. This result arises as a consequence of the internalization of a pricing externality among the merging firms (insiders) in the presence of consumer search. Because some consumers always buy from the cheapest store, if one of the stores of the merging firms happened to be the cheapest in the market, there would be no reason to charge similar low prices in the other store of the merged firm. This implies that prices at one of the retail shops of the merged firm would typically be higher than at the outsiders' shops. Since consumers do not see prices without searching, rational consumers, anticipating this, would find it optimal not to visit the retail shops of the merging firms in the first place. To avoid this problem, the merged firm must credibly commit not to increase their after-merger prices relative to the non-merging firms.
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Our second result is about the effects of a merger on consumer welfare. We show that a merger influences the distribution of prices in a non-uniform way. In particular, we observe that after a merger the frequency with which low and very high prices are quoted decreases while the frequency of intermediate prices increases. The dominating effect on shoppers is the influence of an increase in the lower bound of the price distribution, and thus, a merger hurts low search cost consumers. At the same time the change in the price distribution benefits high search cost consumers because they pay lower prices on average. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical literature on mergers has not paid much attention to the effects of mergers on different transaction prices. Our result suggests that there may be significant redistributive effects on the demand side that are worthwhile to study.
Our final result is related to the incentives to merge. We show that whether mergers are incentive-compatible or not hinges upon the level of search costs. When search costs are relatively low, in equilibrium all consumers participate in the market. In this case, mergers are unprofitable and therefore we may expect that mergers do not take place. This result thus confirms that a merger paradox arises in Bertrand markets for homogeneous products when search costs are relatively small and unimportant. When search costs are relatively high instead, some consumers find it optimal not to participate in the market and do not search at all. In this case, a merger results in a change in the search composition of demand such that merging firms may obtain larger profits in the post-merger situation than in the pre-merger one. This is because ceteris paribus a merger results in a lowering of the average price in the market, which is precisely the price that triggers search. Non-shoppers who did not find it worthwhile to search in the pre-merger situation, start searching post-merger. Relative to the pre-merger situation, the ratio of active non-shoppers to shoppers increases in the post-merger market and this explains the increase-in-profits result. The paper thus shows that when search costs are relatively important then merging is profitable, even if products are homogeneous and there is no cost efficiency to be gained from the merger. Interestingly, compared to earlier work on mergers, the profitability of the merger here stems form a demand expansion effect, rather than from price increases.
Incentive-compatible mergers turn out to lead to an increase in consumer participation and this has the potential to make them even socially desirable (from a total surplus point of view). We show that this is always the case when demand is inelastic, while with downward sloping demand it is the case when the share of fully informed consumers is low enough.
Even though our theoretical inquiry is special in that it deals with mergers between sellers of homogeneous products in search markets, we do think that this consumer search perspective is important when considering mergers in actual industries. Some markets such as gasoline, airlines and financial markets are usually concentrated markets where mergers are frequently proposed. Moreover, consumer search is important as evidenced by the significant price dispersion existing in these markets (see e.g. Baye and Morgan, 2001 for mortgages; Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004 for financial products; and Lach and Moraga-González, 2008 for gasoline). 7 The empirical literature documenting the effects of mergers on prices has shown that average prices can go up or down (see Whinston, 2006) . Some studies (see, e.g., Borenstein, 1990 and Kim and Singal, 1993 on airlines, Prager and Hannan, 1998 on banks) report that post-merger prices first increase and then decrease. This is then interpreted 7 Other markets such as those for electronics, perfumes, groceries, clothing, drugs, etc. are also markets of interest. In these sorts of market, firms often carry similar products, prices are typically dispersed (Lach, 2002; Sorensen, 2000) and therefore consumer search is important.
as that one first observes the effects of an increase in market power and cost efficiencies due to synergies are only felt at a later stage. At the same time, merging firms typically reorganize their business by closing down bank branches, adjusting flight frequency, etc. The results in our paper are consistent with this evidence even in the absence of cost synergies. Accordingly, our interpretation of the same data is different. After a merger, all firms raise their prices but the insiders' prices tend to go up more than outsiders' prices; this leads consumers to visit the non-merging firms more frequently than the merging firms until the merging firms close down one of their stores; thereafter average prices decrease.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the consumer search model and Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis. Here we show that when the first price quotation is costless, there are three types of equilibria. The distinct types of equilibria differ in the price level that can be sustained as well as in the extent of consumer participation. Section 4 delves into the two questions related to the incentives to merge and the welfare implications of mergers. Section 5 develops an extension of the basic model where we replace the set of identical high search cost consumers with a heterogeneous group of consumers who differ in their search cost. We show that the results discussed above remain the same and that the only change is with respect to the search behavior of the consumers. Section 6 concludes and provides a discussion of the main assumptions of the paper. All proofs are placed in an appendix at the end of the paper.
The Model
We study mergers in the standard consumer search model of Stahl (1989) , but we assume that all price quotations are costly to obtain. The assumption that consumers obtain the first price quotation at no cost was first adopted in the search literature for reasons related to existence of equilibrium and has perhaps become a tradition. It boils down to assuming the market is fully covered. As shown in Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) and in Janssen et al. (2005) , this assumption is not without loss of generality and precludes the analysis of markets where consumer participation is endogenous, which is a more natural situation. This paper extends the theoretical framework of our earlier papers by considering downwardsloping demand. Downward-sloping demand is crucial to an analysis of mergers as it allows total surplus to decrease as a consequence of increasing prices.
The features of the model are as follows. There are N ≥ 3 firms that produce a homogeneous good at constant returns to scale. Their identical unit cost can be normalized to zero and prices can be interpreted as price-to-cost margins. There is a unit mass of buyers and we assume that buyers' demand curves are given by D(p), with D (p) < 0, where p is the price at which the consumer decides to buy. In some of the analysis we assume for convenience that demand is linear, i.e., D(p) = a − bp, with a > 0, b > 0. It will be useful to denote the revenue function as R(p) = pD(p); we assume that R(p) is monotonically increasing up to the monopoly price, denoted, p m . Let R −1 (·) be the inverse of the revenue function. The surplus of a consumer who buys at price p is denoted as CS(p) = ∞ p D(p)dp. A proportion λ ∈ (0, 1) of the consumers has zero opportunity cost of time and therefore searches for prices costlessly. These consumers are referred to as 'shoppers' or low search cost consumers. The rest of the buyers, referred to as 'non-shoppers' or high search cost consumers, must pay search cost c > 0 to observe every price quotation they get, including the first one. Non-shoppers search for lower prices sequentially, i.e., a buyer first decides whether to sample a first firm or not and then, upon observation of the price of the first firm, decides whether to search for a second price or not, and so on. To avoid situations where non-shoppers do not enter the market at all, we assume searching is not prohibitively costly, i.e., CS(0) = ∞ 0 D(p)dp > c. Firms and buyers play the following game. An individual firm chooses its price taking price choices of the rivals as well as consumers' search behavior as given. An individual buyer forms conjectures about the distribution of prices in the market and decides on his/her optimal search strategy. We confine ourselves to the analysis of symmetric Nash equilibria.
8
The equilibrium distribution of prices in an N -firm market is denoted by F N (p), its density by f N (p) and the lower and the upper bound of its support by p N and p N , respectively. It is obvious that firms will never set prices above the monopoly price.
Equilibria
In this Section we characterize the symmetric equilibrium of the pre-merger market and show that there exist three types of symmetric equilibrium. The distinct types of equilibrium differ in the price levels that can be sustained and hold for different magnitudes of search costs. For a given level of search cost, only one of these types of equilibrium holds. This result is important in our study of mergers later because the effects of mergers depend on the level of search costs.
We start by characterizing optimal consumer search. For this purpose, we invoke some results already known in the consumer search literature.
Lemma 1
If there exists a symmetric equilibrium, then (i) non-shoppers search either once surely, or mix between searching once and not searching, and (ii) firms set prices randomly drawn from an atomless price distribution.
The ideas underlying this lemma are as follows. The optimal strategy of non-shoppers is to use a reservation price. If non-shoppers were not active at all, or if all non-shoppers would search at least two firms, then firms would have no other equilibrium choice than charging the competitive price. In that case, non-shoppers' behavior would not be optimal. Next, due to the presence of shoppers no price in the support of the symmetric equilibrium can be charged with positive probability as it would be profitable to undercut any price above marginal cost, while due to the fact that some non-shoppers search one time, charging price equal to marginal cost can also not be optimal. Finally, in a symmetric equilibrium in continuous mixed strategy no firm would charge a price equal to the upper bound, if this upper bound is larger than the reservation price of non-shoppers as this would lead to no sales. As all firms charge prices at or below a consumer's reservation price, no non-shopper would search more than one time. Note that these remarks imply that non-shoppers either search for one price with probability one, or mix between searching once and not searching at all. In either case, they do not compare prices.
In conclusion, symmetric equilibrium implies that firms mix in prices and non-shoppers either search for one price surely, or mix between searching once and not searching. In what follows we examine the characterization and the existence of equilibrium. The case in which consumers mix between searching one time and not searching is treated in the subsection on high search costs; the other case, which is similar to Stahl's (1989) equilibrium is discussed later in the subsection on low search costs.
High search cost
Suppose that non-shoppers mix between searching once and not searching. Let µ ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability with which non-shoppers are active in the market. In this case the expected payoff to a firm i from charging price p i when its rivals choose a random pricing strategy according to the cumulative distribution F (·) is
The expression in square-brackets represents the quantity firm i expects to sell at price p i . The firm expects to serve the shoppers when it happens to be the case that its price is lower than its rivals' prices; likewise, the firm expects to sell to the non-shoppers when they happen to visit its store. In equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent between charging any price in the support of the price cdf, i.e., π i (p i , F (p i )) = π i (p N , 1); this indifference condition allows us to calculate the equilibrium price distribution:
Given that consumers are indifferent between searching once and not searching, the upper bound of the price distribution must be equal to the monopoly price p m for otherwise a firm charging a price equal to an upper boundp < p m would gain by increasing its price. The lower bound of the price distribution can easily be calculated by setting F (p N ) = 0 and solving for p N .
The cumulative distribution (2) represents optimal firm pricing, given consumer search behavior. We now turn to find the conditions under which the assumed buyer search activity is optimal. For non-shoppers to mix between searching once and not searching, it must be the case that the surplus they expect to get in the market is equal to the search cost, i.e.,
We can use the variable change z = 1 − F N (p) to rewrite condition (3) as follows:
Let us denote the LHS of (4) as β N (µ), which denotes the incremental gains to a nonshopper from entering the market. Note that this function also depends on λ and demand parameters; to save on space we will not write this dependency unless necessary. Since CS(·) is a decreasing function while R −1 (·) is an increasing function, it is straightforward to verify that β N (µ) decreases in µ (see Figure 1 below for a plot). It is also easy to check that β N (µ) converges to CS(0) as µ → 0; likewise, as µ approaches 1, β N (µ) converges to a strictly positive number denoted β N (1). To understand these remarks, notice that when µ → 0, only shoppers are left in the market so pricing must be competitive; in that case, the incremental gains from searching over not searching are highest and equal CS(0). As the number of nonshoppers increases, pricing becomes more monopolistic and the non-shoppers' gains from participation decrease.
This leads to the following existence and uniqueness result.
. Then there exists a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where prices are distributed according to the cdf given in (2) and non-shoppers mix between searching once for one price with probability µ N and not searching at all with the remaining probability, with µ N given by the solution to (4) . In equilibrium an individual firm obtains an expected profit equal to π N = µ N (1 − λ)R(p m )/N, non-shoppers obtain an expected surplus equal to zero and shoppers obtain and expected surplus equal to
Low search cost
Suppose that non-shoppers search for one price with probability 1, as in Stahl (1989) . In this case the expected payoff to a firm i from charging price p i when its rivals choose a random pricing strategy according to the cumulative distribution F (·) is
The interpretation of this expression is similar to that in (1). Proceeding as before we can calculate the equilibrium price distribution:
The cdf in (6) represents optimal firm pricing given that non-shoppers search once surely. Let us now check when such behavior is optimal for consumers. If consumers do not search further it is because the expected gains from search are lower than the search cost. Let us define the reservation price ρ N as the price that makes a non-shopper indifferent between searching once more and accepting ρ N right away; this price satisfies:
Notice that the LHS of (7) is increasing in ρ N so that ρ N is increasing in c. If in equilibrium consumers do not search further it is indeed because firms do charge prices not greater than ρ N because otherwise consumers would go on with their search. As a result,p ≤ ρ N ; we also know that prices above the monopoly price are not optimal either. These two observations imply that the maximum price charged in the market must satisfȳ
Consider the search cost c such that the reservation price which solves (7) equals the monopoly price. Using the expression of β N (·) introduced above, this search cost satisfies
For search costs c ≥ c, the upper bound of the equilibrium price distributionp is equal to p m . For non-shoppers to search for one price surely it must be the case that, ex-ante, they expect to get sufficient surplus to cover the search cost, i.e., that β N (1) > c.
When c < c, the upper bound of the equilibrium price distributionp is equal to ρ N , where ρ N solves (7), which can be rewritten as
For non-shoppers to search for one price surely it must be the case that, ex-ante, they expect to get sufficient surplus to cover the search cost, i.e.,
which holds when (10) is satisfied. Then we have the following result:
Then there exists a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where firms prices are distributed according to the cdf given in (6) with p N = ρ N and non-shoppers search for one price with probability 1. The reservation value ρ N solves (7).
(
. Then there exists a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where firms prices are distributed according to the cdf given in (6) with p N = p m and non-shoppers search for one price with probability 1. In equilibrium firms obtain expected profits equal to π N = (1 − λ)R(p N )/N, non-shoppers obtain an expected surplus equal to p N p N CS(p)f N (p)dp > 0 and shoppers obtain an expected surplus equal to
Our results show there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where consumers may either search once surely, or mix between searching once and not searching. The ranges of search costs for which the distinct equilibrium types exist are shown in Figure 1 . When search cost is low, consumers search once surely and their threat to search further restricts pricing in that the maximum price charged in the market is the reservation price ρ N < p m . When search cost is moderate, consumers search also one time surely but the firms can safely charge prices up to the monopoly price, since buyers' threat to continue searching is less effective. Finally, when search costs are sufficiently high, non-shoppers expect prices to be that high that they are indifferent between searching once and not searching. Proposition 3 Suppose two firms merge and that consumers know the identity of the merging firms; then, the merged entity prefers to be in control of a single price rather than in control of two prices. Moreover, it is optimal for the merging firms to close down one of their stores.
The idea behind the proof of this result is as follows. Since merging does not bring any cost reduction, in the post-merger market consumers must be indifferent between shopping at the merging stores and shopping at the non-merging stores, for otherwise the pricing of either type of firm would not be optimal. Given this, we show that if the merging firms did control two prices in the post-merger putative equilibrium, the unilateral incentives of the merging stores would lead them to charge higher prices on average than the non-merging firms. This is because if the price of one of the merging stores is aimed at attracting the shoppers, the other store has an incentive to raise its price all the way till the monopoly price. This constitutes a contradiction as consumers would not then wish to visit any of the merging firms.
In the merger analysis that follows, we use Proposition 3 and study the case where the merging firms shut down one of their stores. We note that this closing-down argument seems to hold quite generally in a consumer search context. For example, it extends to situations where consumers know a merger has taken place in the market but do not know the identity of the merging firms. We spell out the basic ideas behind this extension in the Conclusions section. Moreover, it can be extended to the case in which the merged firm can commit to charging the same price in the two stores. The argument is similar because, in that case, the merged entity would have a larger share, namely 2/N , of non-shoppers and would thus charge higher prices (cf. Baye et al., 1992) than non-merged firms. Again, non-shoppers, anticipating this, will direct their search effort to the non-merged firms, making it profitable for the merging firms to close down one shop. 
Incentives to merge
While comparative statics exercises with respect to the number of firms in the industry have been performed before in the consumer search literature, to the best of our knowledge, the incentives of firms to merge have not been studied in a search model. A merger is individually rational if the post-merger profits of the merged entity are larger than their collective profits before the merger:
Since profits depend critically on search activity, the incentives to merge hinge upon the magnitude of search costs. In addition, we show that mergers may be profitable due to a demand expansion effect, which contrasts with the results in the existing literature where mergers are profitable because of the price increases of insiders and outsiders. The first result of Proposition 4 is interesting because it shows that a "merger paradox" can also arise under price competition. This happens when the cost of search is relatively low. Building on Proposition 2, it is necessary to distinguish two cases. Consider first the case in which β N (1)−CS(p m ) < c < β N (1). In that case, the market is fully covered and consumers' threat to search does not constrain firms' pricing significantly so the profits of a typical firm in an N -firm market equal R(p m )(1 − λ)/N . Since 2N > N + 1, it is clear that a merger cannot be profitable in this case. Consider now the case in which 0 < c < β N (1) − CS(p m ). In this case, search cost is that low that the reservation value of the consumers is binding. A typical firm's profits in an N -firm market equal R(ρ N )(1 − λ)/N . We show in the appendix that a merger results in a lowering of the reservation value so that the profits of the merging firms fall after the merger.
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The second part of Proposition 4 shows that merging is individually rational for the merging firms provided the cost of search is sufficiently large. In that case, a merger results in a change in the search composition of demand such that merging firms may obtain larger profits in the post-merger situation than in the pre-merger one. This is because ceteris paribus a merger results in a lowering of the average price in the market, which is precisely the price that triggers non-shoppers' decision to search.
11 Non-shoppers who did not find it worthwhile to search in the pre-merger situation, start searching post-merger. Relative to the pre-merger situation, the ratio of active non-shoppers to shoppers increases in the post-merger market and this explains the increase-in-profits result.
The idea behind part (ii ) in Proposition 4 is in Figure 2 . The thicker curve shows nonshoppers' incremental gains from searching once rather than not searching at all in the premerger situation, while the thinner curve shows these gains in the post-merger situation. For a fixed participation rate of the non-shoppers, the post-merger gains lie above the pre-merger gains. The search intensities of the non-shoppers in the pre-and post-merger markets are then given by the intersection of these curves with the cost of search; these search intensities are such that µ N > µ N +1 . In the appendix we show that this increase in participation can be sufficiently large so as to make mergers profitable, which occurs when
It is worth to emphasize that the nature of our result about merger profitability is quite different from earlier work on mergers under price competition (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985). While there a merger is profitable because insiders and outsiders raise prices (and so aggregate output falls), here a merger is profitable due to a demand expansion effect. However, as in Deneckere and Davidson (1985) , also here the outsiders take a free ride and benefit more than the outsiders.
The welfare effects of mergers
We start by studying the implications of mergers on the different agents in the market. Evern though on the basis of Proposition 4 one would not expect mergers to occur if search costs are low, it is known that mergers occur for reasons other than firm profitability. Therefore, it is instructive to study the aggregate implications of mergers for all possible parameters of the model. This result shows that a merger decreases shoppers' surplus and (weakly) increases nonshoppers' surplus. This difference in the way a merger affects shoppers and non-shoppers deserves an explanation. Recall that non-shoppers buy at the first price they encounter while shoppers pay the minimum price of all the prices they see in the market. Consider first the effects of a merger on the expected surplus of the non-shoppers. Since they buy at the first shop they encounter, their expected surplus is equal to ∞ −∞ CS(p)f N (p)dp. To illustrate, Figure 3 shows the equilibrium price distributions before and after a merger.
12 On the one hand, after a merger, the lower bound of the support of the price distribution goes up while, on the other hand, the upper bound of the price support (weakly) decreases. In addition, it can be seen that the pre-merger and the post-merger price distribution always cross at a unique point. Therefore, low prices and high prices become less frequent in favor of intermediate prices and, as a result, the pre-and the post-merger price distributions cannot be generally ranked using the first-order stochastic dominance criterion. Our proof in the appendix shows that the decrease in the frequency of high prices is of first order importance so overall non-shoppers derive a higher surplus after a merger. Consider now the effects of a merger on the expected surplus of the shoppers. Since shoppers buy at the minimum price in the market, their expected surplus is equal to N
To illustrate, Figure 4 shows the pre-and post-merger distribution of minimum prices (denoted F (min{p}) in the graph). As mentioned above, firms' incentives to compete for the shoppers weaken as fewer firms remain in the market and therefore, the chance of observing relatively low prices decreases as well. This tends to harm these consumers and our proof shows this effect results in lower expected surplus for the shoppers.
Proposition 5 shows that the effects of mergers hinge upon the magnitude of search costs. When the cost of search is low a merger lowers the collective profits of the firms, increases the surplus of the non-shoppers and lowers the welfare of the shoppers.
By contrast, incentive-compatible mergers increase industry profits at the expense of the surplus of the shoppers, while non-shoppers continue to obtain zero surplus. It is then interesting to see the relative strengths of these effects in case of incentive-compatible mergers 12 In the graphs that follow, we set N = 2, λ = 0.4 and assume D(p) = 1, for all p ≤ v and 0 otherwise. When the search cost is high, we set it equal to 0.7.
13 Recall that firms choose their prices to balance the gains from selling to shoppers and non-shoppers. After a merger, attracting non-shoppers and shoppers becomes easier; however, relative to the pre-merger situation attracting the shoppers becomes disproportionately easier than attracting the non-shoppers and this leads to more aggressive pricing on average. As a result, the expected surplus of the non-shoppers increases.
(a) Minimum price cdf when search cost is high (b) Minimum price cdf when search cost is low Figure 4 : Distributions of the minimum price before and after merger.
by considering total surplus
as a measure of welfare (note that non-shoppers get zero surplus when mergers are incentivecompatible). Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to arrive at general results in this context. Our next result therefore considers two cases. First, in the case of unit demand the increase in industry profits more than offsets the decrease in the surplus of the shoppers and therefore total surplus increases. Second, under linear demand when the market hosts few shoppers, welfare also increases as a result of the merger. Numerical results (some of which are presented after the proposition) suggest that this welfare result also holds when the fraction of shoppers is larger. The inelastic demand case allows for more definite results because there are no welfare effects associated to price changes other than those related to the rate of participation of the non-shoppers. As a result, total surplus generated in the market takes a simple expression:
, where v is the consumers' willingness to pay. This expression reflects two facts. One, a shopper always acquires one unit from the cheapest supplier thus generating a surplus equal to v; two, a non-shopper only buys with probability µ N ≤ 1, in which case a surplus of v − c is generated. The proof shows that µ N is decreasing in N implying that total surplus is higher after a merger.
Price changes do have welfare effects under linear demand and this situation is therefore more difficult to analyze analytically beyond the case where the fraction of shoppers is small. Numerical analysis of the model reveals that the result reported in the second part of Proposition 6 holds also in markets with a larger number of shoppers. To illustrate this, Table 1 shows the relevant equilibrium variables when 50% of the consumers are shoppers and 50% are non-shoppers. For this example we take demand to be q = 1 − 0.9p and the search cost c = 0.4. For these parameters, non-shoppers enter the market with probability µ. The Table shows that mergers increase the participation rate of the non-shoppers. This leads to a rise in firm profits and aggregate welfare. Again, shoppers lose when mergers occur. 
N=2

Search cost heterogeneity
So far we have assumed that all non-shoppers have identical search cost. In reality, search costs will be more smoothly distributed across the consumer population. In this section, we relax the equal-search-cost assumption and consider the case where non-shoppers have different search costs. To keep things relatively simple, we introduce search cost heterogeneity in a way that extends the analysis in the main body of the paper. In the concluding section we will discuss more informally some results that can be obtained in a more general search model.
We consider a situation where consumers demand one unit of the good at most, and their common valuation is equal to v. Let search costs be uniformly distributed in the interval [c, c], with v ≥ c > c > 0, and assume that in equilibrium there exists a consumer with search cost c who is indifferent between searching once and not searching, i.e., for whom the expected surplus equals zero, i.e., v − E[p] − c = 0. Non-shoppers with search costs below c will search while those with search cost above c will not participate in the market. Assume also that consumers who search do not search beyond the first firm; denoting the reservation value of the consumer with the lowest search cost c by ρ(c), this assumption amounts to assuming that the upper bound of the price distribution p ≤ ρ(c).
An equilibrium with these characteristics can be constructed and we use it to show that the results on mergers above also hold here. In an equilibrium with these features, firms must mix in prices, and the upper bound of the price distribution must equal ρ(c). The constancy of profits condition requires that the payoff to a firm i from charging a price p < ρ(c) equals the payoff to a firm charging the upper bound ρ(c) :
Solving for the price cdf gives
. The reservation value of the consumer with search cost c is the maximum price she would accept without searching further, which solves
Since ρ N (c) is the upper bound of the price distribution, this equation can be rewritten
F N (p)dp. Changing variables we can write E[p] = 
The critical consumer c N , who is indifferent between searching once and not searching is calculated by solving
Equations (12) to (15) define a candidate equilibrium. To complete the characterization we need to show that no firm has an incentive to charge prices outside the support of the price distribution. It is obvious that a firm would not gain by charging a price less than the lower bound p. Consider a firm deviating by charging a price p above the upper bound, i.e., p > ρ N (c). To calculate the payoff of the deviant, notice that, given the strategy of the other firms, the deviant firm will not attract any of the shoppers; moreover, note that some of the non-shoppers, in particular those with reservation prices less than p, will continue to search. Let c be the search cost of the consumer whose reservation value is p, i.e., p satisfies p − E[p] − c = 0. If p is so large that c > c N then no buyer will buy from the deviant. If p is not so high, then the payoff to the deviant would be Eπ
. At p = ρ N (c), this profit expression equals the equilibrium profits. Taking the derivative of this profit formula with respect to p yields
, which is clearly negative for search cost distributions with a sufficiently small range.
We are now ready to study the effects of mergers on firm profits and welfare. The profits of a firm in this market are given by Eπ N = Parameters are v = 10, c = 5.5, c = 7.5; λ = 0.5. 
. Total welfare W is also increasing after a merger, and more surprisingly, the surplus of the non-shoppers is increasing as well. This last result follows from two facts. First, the expected price decreases after a merger implying that non-shoppers who are active before and after the merger receive a higher expected surplus. Second, there are more active non-shoppers after the merger (as can be seen from the fact that c N is decreasing in N ). This group of consumers now has a positive expected surplus against a surplus of 0 before the merger.
Discussion and conclusions
We have studied mergers in a market where N firms sell a homogeneous good and consumers search sequentially to discover prices. The main motivation for this study has been that mergers generally affect market prices and thereby, in a search environment, the search intensity of the consumers. We have seen that endogenous changes in consumer search behavior have the potential to reinforce or, alternatively, offset the initial price effects of a merger. Interestingly, when search costs are relatively large, a merger results in a decrease in the expected price and since this is precisely the price which triggers search for consumers with relatively high search cost, non-shoppers who didn't find it worthwhile to search in the pre-merger situation, start searching post-merger. We have seen how this "boost-indemand" effect of mergers can make mergers incentive-compatible for the firms and socially desirable. This result seems to be relatively robust, since it holds under unit demand, elastic demand, and search cost heterogeneity. Another interesting finding has been that mergers affect distinct consumers in different ways, so mergers have distributional effects not only between firms and consumers but also between different types of consumers. When search costs are relatively small instead, mergers turn out not to be profitable for the merging firms, which shows that a "merger paradox" can also arise under price competition.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper on mergers in markets with search frictions. Along the way, we have restricted the analysis to a specific environment. One aspect of the model set-up we have analyzed is that consumers know the identity of the merging firms. Building on the distinction between the gains from searching among the merged firms and the gains from searching among the non-merging firms, we have proven that the merging firms do not have an incentive to continue to operate two stores. If a firm did continue operating two shops, it would be tempted to increase one of its prices all the way up to the monopoly price which, as a result, would drive consumers away from the merging firms. We have argued that this problem would persist even if the merging firms could credibly commit not to charge different prices at the two different shops, since even in this case the merging firms would be charging on average higher prices than the non-merging firms.
An interesting issue is what would happen if consumers could not tell which firms have merged. It turns out that the merging firms are strictly better off by letting consumers know about the identity of the merging stores; this is because otherwise non-shoppers' incentives to enter the market after the merger would be weakened and so the potential for merging profitably would be reduced. The idea is again that consumers, knowing that a merger has occurred, would expect one of the (merging) stores to be charging the monopoly price, which increases average prices in the market and lowers incentives to participate in the market altogether.
14 Another restriction we have imposed relates to the fact that consumers are quite homogeneous. Although we have analyzed an extension of the basic model where we allow some form of search cost heterogeneity, we have not addressed the more general situation where valuations and search costs of consumers follow some (arbitrary) distribution. Such a more general analysis is interesting as it will bring out other ways in which the composition of demand may change because of a merger. From the analysis in this paper we know that the ratio of consumers who search only once relative to the consumers who compare more prices is an important factor determining market outcomes. In the present paper, this ratio can change after a merger, as some consumers will start searching after the merger instead of not searching at all. In a more general setup, it may very well be the case that the composition of demand will be affected in different ways, for example, that a larger share of consumers will search less intensely (i.e. accept higher prices right away) after a merger. 15 We hope to investigate these issues in future work.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Since these are standard results we omit details to save space. The proof that non-shoppers will not search beyond the first firm is standard (see Stahl, 1989) .
Optimal search implies the use of a reservation price. If in an equilibrium with prices above marginal cost non-shoppers walk away from a firm, they either come back to that firm or end up buying somewhere else. In either of these cases, a firm has a profitable deviation. If all firms charge the marginal cost, then consumers will not search beyond the first firm. When the search cost is very high, it does not pay a consumer to search that much and therefore a non-shopper mixes between searching and not searching (see Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004; and Janssen et al., 2005).
Proof of Proposition 3. We first show that firms will quote prices in such a way that non-shoppers will not search beyond the first firm. Let F 1 i (p) and F 2 i (p) be the (mixed) strategies of the two shops of the merged entity; likewise, let F −i (p) denote other firms' (mixed) strategies. Let the supports of these mixed strategies be given by [p
16 Consider a consumer who has observed a price p. The consumer's gains from searching one more time depend on whether the consumer ventures one of the stores of the merged entity, or else one of the shops of the non-merging firms. Let f 1 i (x) and f 2 i (x) denote the price densities corresponding to the merged entity's shops. A consumer who ventures one of the merged entity's shops should then expect a price according to the density function [f
. Therefore, the gains from search for a consumer who searches randomly among the merging firms are
likewise, the gains from search for a consumer who searches one of the merging firms after having visited the other merged firm are
Finally, the gains from searching among the non-merging firms are
where f −i (x) denotes the price density function of a non-merging firm. Given these expressions, we can define the reservation price of the non-shoppers for continued search among the different search alternatives: the price ρ i (respectively ρ
. Similar arguments as in Stahl (1989) imply that none of the firms will charge a price above min{ρ
m } so non-shoppers will visit one of the stores and stop searching there. The main point to realize here is that a firm charging max{p There are then three cases to be distinguished: (i) non-shoppers prefer to visit first one of the shops of the merged entity, (ii) non-shoppers prefer to first visit one of the non-merged firms and (iii) non-shoppers are indifferent between shops, whether from a merged firm or not. We now discuss these cases in turn.
(i) Suppose non-shoppers prefer to visit first one of the shops of the merged firm. In this case, the non-merging stores will only sell to the shoppers, if at all, in which case the price distribution of a non-merging store should be degenerated at the marginal cost. This constitutes a contradiction, however, as then the non-shoppers would prefer to visit one of the non-merging stores as well.
(ii) Consider next the case that non-shoppers prefer to visit first one of the non-merged firms. This implies that the merged firm will only attract the shoppers who are informed about all the prices. In this case -if it can happen at all in equilibrium-the merged firm (weakly) prefers not to set different prices in the two stores as the store with the highest price does not generate any sales.
(iii) So, if in equilibrium the merged firm prefers to set different prices in the two stores, it must be the case that the non-shoppers are indifferent between visiting one of the nonmerged firms and visiting one of the merged firm's stores. In this case, the payoff to the merging firm setting prices p 
(17) This profit expression is easily understood on the basis of the following two observations. First, note that each retail store of the merged entity attracts a share 1/N of the nonshoppers, who participate in proportion µ(1 − λ). Second, suppose that p 1 i < p 2 i . The cheapest store, in this case store 1, happens to attract all the shoppers when the price at this store is the lowest in the market, i.e., with probability (
i , the shoppers are indifferent between the two stores so on average half of them show up at store 1 and the other half at store 2.
It is straightforward to see that the profit expression in (17) is monotonically increasing in p 2 i hence the distribution of prices at one of the stores must be degenerated at the upper bound of the price distribution. Given this, it is readily seen that, when choosing p 1 i , the merged entity faces exactly the same tradeoff as the rival firms so in equilibrium we must have
From standard arguments it follows that the price distribution F −i (p) must be atomless, with convex support and mean price E[p] ≤ p.
Consider now a consumer contemplating to venture one of the merging stores. Since buyer conjectures must be correct in equilibrium, this consumer should expect to observe a price equal to (p + E[p])/2 at one of the merging stores. Hence, the expected price at one of the merging stores will be higher than the expected market price so non-shoppers should rather visit one of the rival firms. It then follows that merging firms have an incentive to commit to setting one price and one way to make this commitment credible is to shut down one of the stores.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i ). We first prove that mergers are not incentive compatible when search costs are relatively low, in particular when c < β N (1). Note that in this case non-shoppers participate with probability 1 and the equilibrium characterizations is given in Proposition 2.
The equilibrium price cdf is
where p denotes the upper bound of the price distribution. When search costs are relatively low, it follows from Proposition 2 that p is either equal to the monopoly price p m or to the reservation price ρ N < p m . where ρ N is given by the solution to (7) . For mergers to be incentive-compatible we need that R(p)(1 − λ)/2N be greater than R(p)(1 − λ)/(N + 1). When p = p m it follows immediately that mergers are not profitable. Consider now the case in which p = ρ N . In this case it turns out that ρ N increases in N so mergers are not profitable either. The reservation value ρ N is given by the solution to equation (7), which can be rewritten as
Let
pf N (p)dp
Using the change of variables z = 1 − F (p), these two integrals can be written as follows:
Plugging these in (1) we get
Let us denote the LHS of (19) by H(·). We are interested in the derivative of ρ N with respect to N (actually we want to prove that ρ N increases in N ). Using the implicit function theorem we have
Above in the paper we have proven that
It thus remains to prove that
Let us now look at the two integrals in this last expression. We know that 1−
For the second integral we have
This proves that
The desired result follows.
Part (ii ). We now prove that when search costs lie in the range c ∈ (β N (1) , CS(0)) mergers may be profitable for the merging firms. First note that in equilibrium non-shoppers randomize between searching once and not searching in both the pre-merger and the post-merger equilibria. The participation rate of the non-shoppers in the pre-merger and post-merger situations, µ N +1 and µ N , are given by the solution to the following equations:
respectively. Therefore, it must be the case that (using the variable change
For the linear demand case, this equation can be rewritten as
Merging is profitable for the merging firms when π N +1 < π N /2, that is, when
. Given that the equality in (25) must hold in equilibrium, merging is profitable if
where
We now prove that I 1 > I 3 for µ N small enough. Note that
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to µ N we have
In a neighborhood of µ N = 0, the sign of this expression equals the sign of
To complete the argument, we now prove that I 2 < I 4 for µ N sufficiently small. That is, we need to show that
The sign of this expression is equal to the sign of
In a neighborhood of µ N = 0, this reduces to
where the last inequality follows from the proof above that I 1 > I 3 . Since µ N → 0 as c → CS(0), the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5. Part (i). For these parameters, industry profits are equal to (1 − λ)R(ρ N ). Since ρ N decreases after a merger (cf. Proposition 4), it follows that the collective profits of the firms go down if a merger occurs. The surplus of the non-shoppers can be written as c + CS(ρ N ) (cf. equation 10) so it follows that non-shoppers benefit from a merger. The proof that the surplus of the shoppers increases after a merger is similar to the proof in Part (ii) in this Proposition and therefore omitted to save on space.
Part (ii) Industry profits are equal to µ N (1 − λ)R(p m ) and they are clearly increasing in µ N . As µ N > µ N +1 , if c > β N (1), the result on profits follows trivially. The result for the shoppers simply follows from the fact that if c > β N (1), they are indifferent between searching once and not searching so that their expected surplus equals 0.
Consider now the expected surplus of the shoppers, which is equal to
where F N (p) denotes the distribution of the minimum price of a random draw of size N when N firms operate in the market. As before, denoting R(p) = p(a − bp), we rewrite (29) as follows:
The objective is to prove that
Or, using (30) , that
We first show that the first term of the LHS of (31) is greater than the first term of its RHS, i.e.,
Using the change of variables z = 1 − F (p), this is equivalent to proving that 
where γ = . We next consider the case when z < 1 2 . When γ → ∞, both the LHS and the RHS of (34) converge to 0. We will subsequently show that the derivative of the LHS w.r.t. γ is strictly smaller than that of the RHS, which then implies that the inequality holds for any finite value of γ. Taking the derivatives of both sides of (34) w.r.t. γ, it must be the case that 
The LHS of (35) . To complete the argument we now prove that the second term of the LHS of (31) is larger than the second terms of its RHS, i.e., 
Using the variable change z = 1 − F (p), we can rewrite (36) as 
Note that in this equilibrium the ratio of shoppers to non-shoppers is λ/(µ N (1 − λ)).
As total surplus generated in the market is given by T S = λv +µ N (1−λ)(v −c) it suffices to shows that µ N is decreasing in N . Recall that the LHS of (37) denotes the incremental gains a consumer derives from searching one time over not searching at all. Notice that these gains are decreasing in µ. We now show that these gains are also decreasing in N . For this, we need to prove that (ii) We now discuss the second part of the Proposition dealing with linear demand. Denoting by F N (p) the distribution of the minimum price of a random draw of size N when N firms operate in the market, expected total welfare can be written as which is clearly true for γ N close to zero.
